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of	 a	 corporate	 hierarchy,	 possessed	 of	 all	 of	 the	 powers	 of	 the	 company,	 to	
pursue	the	commercial	objectives	of	it.	Authority	conferred,	corporate	law	does	
however,	provide	for	accountability	in	respect	of	its	exercise,	at	the	instigation	
of	 shareholders,	 the	 company	 itself,	 liquidators	 and	 the	 State.	 These	
accountability	 mechanisms	 created	 at	 the	 institutional	 level	 of	 the	 law,	 are	
perpetuated	 and	 developed	 through	 judicial	 practice	 across	 the	 institutional	
orders.	However,	a	perceived	judicial	deference	towards	business	judgement	is	
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judges	use	 of	 language,	 including	narrative	 and	 rhetoric	 (Gewirtz,	 1996)	 and	
reading	of	texts	is	critical	to	their	work	administering	company	law.		It	is	to	their	
practice	 in	 relation	 to	 business	 judgement,	 and	 specifically	 their	 actions	 and	
decisions	 in	 respect	 of,	 to	 review	or	 not	 review	business	 judgement	 that	 the	





Business	 decisions	 and	 judgements	 are	 an	 everyday	 activity	 in	 the	 lives	 of	
directors.	 The	 contrasting	 arguments	 for	 more	 or	 less	 authority	 and/or	
accountability,	more	or	less	judicial	review,	and	the	rationales	and	governance	
implications	behind	all	of	these,	provoke	a	need	for	insight	as	to	what	is	business	








course	of	 litigation.	Directors	make	and	 judges	regulate	business	 judgements.	
Judges’	practice	in	litigation	is	directly	related	to	directors’	practice	through	the	
causes	of	litigation	brought	by	parties	and	as	such	judicial	practice	transpires	in	
relation	 to	 bundles	 of	 practices	 within	 and	 across	 a	 variety	 of	 institutional	
orders	and	fields.		
	
The	litigation	process	can	be	understood	as	unfolding	in	stages	(Langley,	
1999).	Accountability	under	law	for	business	judgement	is	pursued	through	a	
cause	of	legal	action,	which	is	initially	generated	out	of	a	series	of	events	that	
take	place	in	the	field	of	business	enterprise.	The	cause	of	action	triggers	the	
judicial	process	within	which	the	judge	must	decide	to	review	or	not	review	
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the	business	judgments	of	the	directors	concerned.	The	judge,	when	
considering	action	must	decide	whether	the	action	taken	by	the	director	was	
negligent	or	otherwise	in	breach	of	statutory	provisions,	and	this	requires	a	
judicial	review	of	the	actions	of	the	director.	The	judge,	having	reviewed	or	
taken	a	decision	not	to	review	business	judgments	which	lead	to	those	actions	
then	arrives	at	a	conclusion	and	delivers	a	ruling	which	in	the	English	common	
law	legal	system	has	the	potential	to	create	a	legal	precedent	which	is	binding	
on	future	courts.	In	this	way,	the	judge	can	create	law,	which	contributes	to	the	
regulation	of	directors’	action	in	field	of	corporate	enterprise,	and	in	turn	
impacts	on	the	corporate	governance	mainframe	that	seeks	to	balance	the	
director’s	legal	authority	so	to	act,	and	the	accountability	in	law	for	those	
actions.		
In	the	case	of	Re	Continental	case	that	follows,	the	cause	of	action	was	
commenced	by	the	liquidator	on	behalf	of	the	company,	seeking	personal	
contribution	from	the	former	directors	to	the	company	for	the	alleged	losses	
suffered	as	a	result	of	the	director’s	actions.	The	remainder	of	the	paper	
examines	the	narrative	account	of	judicial	activity	and	practice,	and	specifically	
how	the	judge	accesses,	navigates	and	mediates	available	and	accessible	plural	
logics,	which	characterise	the	institutional	orders	within	which	this	practice	is	
embedded?		
Data	Collection	and	Analysis		
Case	law	exemplifies	the	idea	that	texts	circulate	within	and	inform	practices	
(Schatzki,	2017;	Maquire	and	Hardy,	2013),	it	is	core	to	the	institution	of	law.	
Case	law	represents	an	account	by	a	participant	actor,	the	judge,	who	organises	
a	set	of	events	and	accounts	of	actions	into	a	cohesive	whole	narrative.	In	
keeping	with	a	view	that	language	constitutes	activity	and	practices,	cases	are	a	
highly	reliable	record	of	what	individual	judges	say	and	do,	in	this	instance,	
when	deciding	whether	to	review	or	not	review	the	decisions	of	director.	By	
affording	immersion	in	the	case	of	litigation	and	by	being	rich	in	revelation	of	
the	doings	and	sayings	of	judges	and	other	parties	to	the	litigation,	cases	
facilitate	understanding	of	how	judicial	action	is	organised,	what	was	done,	
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what	could	have	been	done,	what	was	brought	to	the	judgement	and	what	was	
not.	As	such	they	afford	a	practice	ontology	and	processual	understanding	
(Feldman	and	Orlikowski,	2011;	Langley	et	al,	2013;	Langley,	1999).		
Re	Continental	concerned	a	very	expensive	liquidation,	the	costs	of	which	well	
exceeded	£6million.	The	hearing	ran	for	72	days	and	the	recorded	judgement	
was	reported	over	154	pages	in	length	(95,167	words).	An	abductive	analysis	
(Locke,	Golden-Biddle	and	Feldman,	2008)	of	the	case	was	developed	by	
drawing	on	the	empirical	data	offered	by	the	full	text	of	the	judgement,	and	
connecting	that	to	theories	of	practice	and	logics,	to	generate	a	theoretical	
account	of	how	individual	action	relates	to	collective	practices,	logics	and	
orders.		
The	case	was	subjected	to	several	iterations	of	reading,	analysis,	discussion	
and	presentation	involving	two	researchers,	that	is,	the	authors,	one	of	whom	
is	a	lawyer.	The	text	was	first	analysed	for	indicators	of	the	four	organisers	of	
practice:	‘rules,	understandings	(general	and	particular),	and	teleo-affective	
structures’.	With	a	developing	sense	of	understanding	of	the	practice	at	the	
level	of	individual	actor	–	Justice	Park–	we	then	sought	to	understand	and	
embed	this	appreciation	of	judicial	practice	in	its	institutional	context	by	
augmenting	the	practice	perspective	with	a	logics	perspective.		
Further	readings	enabled	us	to	identify	institutional	orders	and	logics	involved	
in	the	case.	The	components	of	practice	and	orders	pointed	the	way	to	the	
logics,	by	relating	judicial	practices	when	reviewing	the	business	judgment	of	
the	directors	to	wider	patterns	of	cultural	symbols	and	practices	(Thornton,	
Ocasio	and	Lounsbury,	2012).	By	seeing	the	judge	as	an	actor	engaged	in	
practice	that	relates	to	several	institutional	orders,	we	sought	to	understand	
and	draw-out	the	logics	at	play	in	the	case	that	are	characteristic	of	one	or	
more	orders.	Analytically,	we	focused	our	attention	on	those	aspects	of	the	raw	
data	of	the	recorded	judgment	where	the	judge	reasons	and	decides.	This	
process	of	analysis	and	interpretation	included	searches	and	coding	of	
language	and	emotion	using	NVivo	computer	software.	Word	occurrences	and	
combination	frequencies	allowed	us	to	capture	data	revealing	of	the	judge’s	
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behaviour	in	fleshing	out	his	reasoning,	showing	his	use	of	vocabulary	and	
frames	of	reference.	These	data	inform	our	finding	that	the	case	involves	two	
logics,	labelled	here	as:	creditor-regarding	and	director-regarding.	These	two	
logics	represent	alternative	values	and	beliefs	at	play	and	which	inform	the	
final	judgement	in	this	case.	
Research	Findings		
Facts:		
The	case	concerned	the	collapse	of	a	small	insurance	company,	and	the	
liquidators	sought	contribution	to	the	company’s	assets	from	the	directors	on	
the	grounds	of	wrongful	trading	and	breach	of	the	duty	of	care.	The	wrongful	
trading	claim	was	brought	on	the	basis	that	the	directors	kept	on	trading,	when	
they	knew	or	should	have	known	that	the	company	was	insolvent.	The	breach	
of	duty	claim	related	to	specific	payments	the	directors	had	made.	One	of	the	
principal	issues	at	the	heart	of	the	litigation	was	that	had	an	appropriate	
accounting	policy	been	adopted	by	the	company,	the	directors	would	and	
should	have	appreciated	that	the	company	was	insolvent,	and	they	would	and	
should	have	stopped	trading.		
	
This	case	reflects	the	efforts	of	the	liquidator,	on	behalf	of	the	company	(in	
liquidation)	and	its	creditors,	to	persuade	the	court,	to	exercise	discretion	
granted	to	it	under	the	corporate	insolvency	legislation,	to	order	the	former	
directors	to	make	significant	personal	contributions	to	the	company,	to	
compensate	it	for	the	losses	suffered	because	of	the	directors’	actions.	This	
provision	is	designed	to	increase	the	amounts	available	to	the	liquidator	to	pay	
the	company’s	creditors.	In	the	event,	the	liquidator’s	case	failed	on	all	counts	
and	the	judge	refused	to	hold	the	directors	liable.	In	what	follows,	our	attention	
is	directed	to	the	judge’s	review	of	the	business	judgments	of	the	former	
directors	–	decisions	taken	to	apply	certain	accounting	principles,	and	to	keep	
on	trading.	
	
Our	analysis	of	the	text	of	the	judgment	first	identifies	the	plurality	of	logics	
encountered	by	the	judge	throughout	the	litigation	process.	The	it	analyses	
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judicial	practice	which	reveals	the	agency	of	the	judge,	but	also	the	collective	
practices	of	judges	in	past	cases	to	which	the	judge	refers	as	precedents	
relevant	to	his	practice,	and	how	through	practice	judges	navigate	these	plural	
logics.	Finally,	it	connects	the	analysis	of	logics	and	practices	to	institutional	
orders	of	society,	the	institution	of	corporate	law	and	the	associated	field	of	
corporate	governance.		
		
Logics		
In	the	recorded	judgment	of	Re	Continental,	the	narrative	reveals	the	focus	of	
the	judge’s	attention,	that	is	the	business	judgment	of	the	company’s	directors,	
and	the	implications	for	and	impact	of	this	on	the	company’s	creditors.	
Throughout	this	narrative,	we	can	detect	patterns	in	the	practices	and	
symbolic	representations,	including	beliefs,	values	and	assumptions	that	guide	
the	legal	theories	he	engages	with,	the	judge’s	frames	of	reference	and	his	
narrative	statements	of	both	the	law	and	the	facts.	We	label	these	patterns	as	a	
‘creditor-	regarding	logic’,	and	a	director-regarding,	‘director’s	business	
judgment	logic’.	
Creditor-regarding	logic		
The	judge,	in	his	consideration	of	the	position	of	the	company’s	creditors,	
blends	concepts	of	corporate	and	insolvency	law	to	guide	his	consideration	and	
actions	regarding	the	protection,	redress	and	remedy	available	to	the	
company’s	creditors	in	respect	of	losses	suffered	by	the	company	as	a	result	of	
the	business	judgment	of	the	directors.	Blending	legal	concepts	of	director	
duties	and	creditor	interests,	the	judgment	narrative	reflects	how	these	
considerations	encourage	the	law	to	elevate	the	interests	of	the	creditors	in	an	
insolvency	situation:	
	
‘…when	a	company	is	insolvent	the	directors,	in	fulfilment	of	their	
duties	to	the	company,	must	recognise	that	the	persons	with	the	
primary	interest	in	it	have	become	the	creditors	rather	than	the	
shareholders.’	
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The	judge	uses	frames	of	reference	which	reflect	his	concerns	for	creditors,	and	
the	protections	and	remedies	he	has	at	his	disposal	with	regard	to	their	
position	in	the	liquidation	that	has	befallen	the	company.	So	he	frequently	
considers	‘the	point	of	view	of	the	creditors’,	different	‘kinds	of	creditors’,	
‘unsecured	creditors’,	‘creditors’	interests’,	their	‘position’,	in	relation	to	each	
other	and	‘improvements’	and	‘worsening’	in	that	position.	He	addresses	‘the	
losses	to	creditors’,	‘deficiency	to	creditors’,	‘assets	available	to	creditors’,	and	
the	question	at	the	heart	of	the	litigation,	the	‘duties	owed’	to	creditors.	
In	summarising	the	complex	and	lengthy	sequence	of	events	leading	up	to	the	
liquidation	of	the	company,	and	constructing	the	‘case	story’,	the	judge	engages	
in	a	narrative	describing	the	complexity	of	those	events,	the	changing	fortunes	
of	the	company	and	referring	in	minute	detail	to	board	meetings,	witness	
recollections	and	minutes	of	these	meetings.	As	the	judge	observes,	‘This	has	
been	a	very	protracted	case	in	every	way...The	hearing	before	me	was	very	
long,	and	I	am	afraid	that	this	judgment	is	very	long	to	match.’			In	parts	the	
judge	uses	a	simplified	example,	to	express	his	interpretation	of	the	law,	to	
‘bring	out	the	question	of	principle’	as	it	applies	to	the	facts	of	the	case,	an	
example	which	reveals	a	creditor-regarding	logic	which	will	inform	his	
decision-making:	
‘I	describe	a	simplified	example	which	brings	out	the	question	of	principle.	….	
The	continued	trading…	(must)	make	the	company's	position	worse,	so	that	it	
has	less	money	available	to	pay	creditors,	rather	than	to	leave	the	company's	
position	at	the	same	level.	It	must	make	the	company's	position	worse	before	it	
becomes	appropriate	for	the	court	to	order	the	directors	to	make	a	
contribution”.	
And	throughout,	there	is	reference	to	the	available	creditor-regarding	logic,	the	
judge	claiming	to	have	‘every	sympathy	for	the	creditors…	for	the	very	real	
misfortunes	of	the	creditors…’	But	the	judge	nevertheless	allows	‘other	
considerations’,	in	which	we	identify	a	competing	logic,	to	guide	his	decision-
making.	This	we	observe	as	a	director-regarding,	‘director’s	business	judgment	
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logic’.	Again,	we	see	how	this	logic	directs	his	theoretical	considerations,	
characterises	the	frames	of	reference,	and	defines	the	judge’s	narrative	of	
events	and	the	law.	
Director’s	Business	Judgment	Logic	
Inherent	within	the	director’s	business	judgment	logic,	is	an	assumption,	a	
belief	that	directors	under	the	enabling	provisions	of	corporate	law	can,	and	
indeed	are	required,	to	exercise	all	of	the	legal	powers	of	the	company	to	carry	
on	the	business	of	the	company,	and	that	accordingly,	subject	to	certain	
requirements	and	conditions,	judicial	deference	should	be	paid	to	director’s	
business	judgments	made	in	the	course	of	this	exercise.	The	law	which	enables	
the	director	and	confers	this	discretion	also	constrains	the	director	by	
imposing	duties	on	directors	requiring	they	take	reasonable	care,	skill	and	
diligence	when	exercising	their	powers.	The	director’s	business	judgment	logic	
therefore	has	two	distinct	but	related	essential	characteristics:	director	
authority	and	director	accountability.		The	narrative	of	judgement	reflects	as	it	
engages	with	legal	theory	around	the	corporate	form,	the	board	of	directors	
that	sits	at	the	top	of	the	corporate	hierarchy,	and	the	law	which	confers	
authority	and	also	imposes	duties	on	directors	in	the	exercise	of	this	authority.	
The	judgement	refers	to	the	director’s	express	‘authority’	and	‘implied	
authority’,	and	to	‘the	nature	and	discharge	of	director’s	duties’,	the	
‘competence	and	understanding’	required	in	the	exercise	of	their	powers.	
Directors	‘have	a	duty	to	use	reasonable	care	and	skill	and	to	act	in	good	faith.’	
But	there	are	then	theoretical	distinctions	to	be	made	when	examining	the	
level	of	‘care	and	skill’	expected,	and	the	judge	goes	on	to	expand	this	through	
frames	of	reference	around	‘standards’.	
The	judge	refers	throughout	to	concepts	of	reasonableness	and	fairness	when	
examining	‘the	standards	the	law	expects’	referring	to	an	objective	minimum	
standard	of	skill	and	care,	in	relation	to	a	director	of	the	type	of	company	
concerned,	which	objective	minimum	can	be	raised	subjectively	depending	on	
the	characteristics	and	experience	of	the	particular	director:	
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	‘The	duty	is	not	to	ensure	that	the	company	gets	everything	right.	The	duty	is	
to	exercise	reasonable	care	and	skill	up	to	the	standard	which	the	law	expects	
of	a	director	of	the	sort	of	company	concerned,	and	also	up	to	the	standard	
capable	of	being	achieved	by	the	particular	director	concerned’.	
Reflecting	this	director-regarding	business	judgment	logic,	the	judge	in	this	
case	concludes	that	the	directors	have	met	those	standards	and	have	
demonstrated	a	‘wholly	responsible	and	conscientious	attitude’.	Despite	that,	
‘with	hindsight	it	can	now	be	seen	that	the	judgment	which	the	directors	
formed	did	not	work	out…that	does	not	mean	it	was	a	breach	of	duty	on	their	
part	to	form	it’	and	that	‘the	directors	behaved	with	a	full	and	proper	sense	of	
responsibility’.	
Again,	in	the	narrative	of	the	law	but	in	the	narrative	of	events	giving	rise	to	
the	cause	of	action,	the	judge	expands	on	the	standards	of	care	and	skill,	again	
reflecting	a	director-regarding	logic.	The	directors	of	Continental	are	directors	
of	an	insurance	company	but	the	judge	comments	on	standards.		
‘In	my	view	they	would	have	been	expected	to	be	intelligent	laymen.	They	
would	need	to	have	a	knowledge	of	what	the	basic	accounting	principles	for	an	
insurance	company	were…	They	would	be	expected	to	be	able	to	look	at	the	
company's	accounts	and,	with	the	guidance	which	they	could	reasonably	
expect	to	be	available	from	the	finance	director	and	the	auditors,	to	understand	
them.	They	would	be	expected	to	be	able	to	participate	in	a	discussion	of	the	
accounts,	and	to	ask	intelligent	questions	of	the	finance	director	and	the	
auditors.	What	I	do	not	accept	is	that	they	could	have	been	expected	to	show	
the	sort	of	intricate	appreciation	of	recondite	accounting	details	possessed	by	a	
specialist	in	the	field…’	
These	directors,	the	judge	concludes,	meet	the	standards	of	skill	and	care	
required	and	expected.	He	contrasts	the	present	case	to	previous	cases	where	a	
creditor-regarding	logic	would	appear	to	have	persuaded	previous	judges	to	a	
finding	of	liability:		
‘None	of	the	previous	cases	in	which	directors	have	been	held	to	be	liable	has	
been	remotely	like	this	one.	Typically,	they	have	been	cases	in	which	the	
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directors	closed	their	eyes	to	the	reality	of	the	company's	position	and	carried	
on	trading	long	after	it	should	have	been	obvious	to	them	that	the	company	
was	insolvent	and	that	there	was	no	way	out	for	it.	In	those	cases,	the	directors	
had	been	irresponsible,	and	had	not	made	any	genuine	attempt	to	grapple	with	
the	company's	real	position.’	
‘Having	heard	the	evidence	I	am	wholly	satisfied	that	that	none	of	the	directors	
viewed	the	position	lightly,	or	approached	it	in	a	perfunctory	manner,	or	had	
any	inclination	to	bury	his	head	in	the	sand	and	just	hope	that	the	problems	
would	go	away....	On	the	contrary,	they	considered	it	directly,	closely	and	
frequently.’	
So,	in	the	end	analysis,	we	can	see	that	the	judge	in	this	case	firmly	rejects	the	
creditor-regarding	logic	and	adopts	categorically	a	director-regarding	business	
judgment	logic.	The	authority	of	the	director	granted	under	the	institution	of	
corporate	law	is	respected,	and	the	business	judgments	made	pursuant	to	that	
authority	are	afforded	protection.		
The	judge	appears	to	go	further	agreeing	with	the	submissions	of	the	directors’	
legal	representatives	condemning	the	liquidator’s	complaints	as	‘infested	with	
hindsight	and	(which)	wholly	ignore	the	realities	of	being	a	company	director’.	
The	accountability,	protection	and	remedy	sought	by	the	liquidator	on	behalf	
of	the	company	and	its	creditors	are	denied.	The	judge	concludes	that	‘the	way	
in	which	the	directors	reacted	…was	entirely	appropriate…and	the	liquidators'	
case	for	liability	…	has	not	been	made	out.	Accordingly,	it	fails.’	
This	manifestation	of	plural	and	competing	logics,	creditor-regarding	and	
director-regarding,	while	it	provides	a	rich	illustration	of	how	multiple	logics	
exist	in	this	domain	of	corporate	law,	our	interest	lies	in	how	this	plurality	
manifests	in	the	practices	of	the	judge,	and	the	implications	of	this	for	the	
broader	societal	context	in	which	this	judicial	practice	plays	out.	We	now	move	
our	analysis	forward,	operationalising	Schatzki’s	concept	of	practice	with	
particular	attention	to	organisers,	with	a	view	to	linking	this	judicial	practice	to	
a	broader	societal	and	institutional	context	
Judicial	practice		
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For	Schatzki	(2017),	organisers	of	practice	are:	rules;	general	and	practical	
understandings;	and	teleo-affective	structure.	Throughout	the	narrative	of	the	
judgement,	the	organising	effect	of	the	rules	of	law	and	procedure	on	the	
judicial	practice	under	consideration	is	clearly	apparent.	These	rules	include	
those	that	come	from	statute	(which	the	judge	refers	to	as	‘the	law’)	and	those	
that	come	from	the	established	common	law,	previous	case	law	(which	the	
judge	refers	to	as	‘the	cases’).	The	doctrine	of	precedent,	operates	as	a	system	
whereby	a	judge	in	the	present	case	is	bound	by	decisions	of	judges	in	previous	
cases,	and	so	lends	a	collective	character	to	the	judge’	s	practice.	These	rules	
are	described	and	ordered	as	the	reference	point	whereby	the	judge	reviews	
and	‘judges’	the	behaviour,	good	and	bad,	of	the	directors,	and	the	business	
judgments	they	made,	and	the	rules	prescribe	the	actions	the	judge	may	take	in	
relation	to	this.	The	judge	sets	out	‘the	full	texts	of	sections	212	and	214	of	the	
Insolvency	Act	1986’,	the	words	of	which	‘are	at	the	very	heart	of	this	case’	and	
which	‘give	to	the	court	a	discretion	to	declare	that	a	director	(or	former	
director)	is	liable	to	make	a	contribution	to	the	company's	assets’.		Having	
referred	to	the	statutory	rules,	the	judge	moves	on	‘to	mention	the	cases’	to	
which	he	gives	‘proper	consideration…in	forming	(his)…	conclusions	in	the	
present	case.’	
	
The	rules	however	only	intermittently	and	partially	determine	what	the	judge	
does	and	says	(Schatzki,	2017).	It	is	the	understandings	expressed	by	the	judge	
around	this	statement	of	the	rules,	that	further	shape	the	practice.		General	
understandings	include	such	things	as	concepts	and	values,	and	in	our	study,	
includes	concepts	of	the	corporation	at	the	heart	of	commercial	life,	and	how	
corporations	are	populated	and	directed	by	categories	of	corporate	actors,	
namely	directors,	boards	and	chairmen.	It	is	also	generally	understood	that	
corporate	enterprise	is	often	heavily	reliant	on	credit,	and	that	credit	as	a	
concept	is	only	viable	if	those	extending	credit	are	afforded	some	protection	in	
relation	to	the	attendant	risk	associated	with	it.	We	can	detect	the	judge’s	
general	understandings	around	duties	and	the	values	and	concepts	of	care,	skill	
and	diligence	expected	of	directors,	but	also	notions	of	reasonableness	and	
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fairness	in	terms	of	protections	and	remedies	that	should	be	available	to	
creditors.			
	
These	general	understandings	inform	the	judge’s	action	‘drawing	a	number	of	
threads	together	and	considering	the	matter	in	a	relatively	general	way’.	We	
see	a	general	understanding	of	the	dilemmas	directors	face	when	the	company	
gets	into	financial	trouble,	and	the	unenviable	position	and	the	decision	they	
face,	‘the	difficult	decision’	to	shut	down	and	go	into	liquidation	or	carry	on	
trading	‘and	hope	to	turn	the	corner’.	There	is	a	general	understanding	of	the	
personal	risks	the	directors	face,	culturally	significant	understandings	about	
‘courage’	and	the	stigma	of	taking	‘the	coward’s	way	out’.	General	
understandings	may	be	seen	here	to	have	an	integrating	function	(Welch	and	
Warde,	2017),	integrating	the	judicial	practices	into	an	overarching	cultural	
formation	(Schatzki,	2002)	as	to	what	standards	of	behaviour,	what	levels	of	
care	and	skill	we	expect	of	directors	in	such	situations,	what	levels	of	personal	
risk	we	expect	them	to	bear,	and	the	extent	of	the	accountability	we	demand	of	
them.	The	judge	demonstrates	this	understanding	in	a	series	of	rhetorical	
questions	(Gewirtz,	1996).	
	
‘In	this	case,	when	the	directors	were	confronted	in	June	1991	with	the	
unwelcome	news	that	Continental	had	suffered	large	and	unforeseen	
losses…Could	they	have	decided	intuitively	that	Continental's	position	was	
hopeless,	that	the	business	should	be	closed-down	instantly,	and	that	a	
liquidation	should	follow	rapidly?	Obviously	not.	Could	they	there	and	then	
have	calculated	for	themselves,	avoiding	intuition,	that	Continental	was	
insolvent	already	and	must	close	down?	Again,	the	answer	is:	obviously	not.’		
	
We	understand	the	judge	to	be	engaging	in	general	understandings	of	notions	
of	pragmatism,	common	sense	and	efficiency	required	of	the	directors	in	
confronting	the	financial	crisis	facing	the	company.	The	judge	refers	
throughout	the	judgment	to	the	skills,	abilities,	and	the	capacities	he	employs	
as	he	reads	and	evaluates	the	documentary	evidence.	‘Having	listened’,	
‘considered’	and	‘re-considered’	the	oral	evidence,	the	judge	then	has	to	
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evaluate	that	evidence.	We	regard	these	as	‘practical	understandings’	used	by	
the	judge	in	settling	his	version	of	the	facts,	from	which	he	then	goes	on	to	
consider	the	law,	and	the	arguments	of	legal	counsel	on	the	law.	His	legal	and	
analytical	skills	then	allow	him	to	interpret	and	apply	the	law	to	the	facts	as	he	
sees	them.	In	this	way	the	judge	describes	how	he	‘reasons’	his	way	to	a	
judgement.	Telos,	can	be	identified	in	the	narrative	of	the	judgement	in	the	
judge’s	empathy	for	the	directors	and	the	‘unenviable	dilemma’	they	face	
regarding	the	decision,	the	business	judgment,	to	trade	on,	or	cease	trading	and	
proceed	to	liquidation.	The	judge’s	tacit	approval	of	the		way	in	which	the	
directors		‘approached’	the	position,	taking	a	‘wholly	responsible	and	
conscientious	attitude	both	to	(the	company’s)	position	and	to	their	own	
responsibilities	as	directors’,	can	be	contrasted	with		his	apparent	
condemnation	of		the	liquidator	on	behalf	of	the	creditors,	who	in	the	judges’	
view,	had	an	‘unrealistic’	and	unreasonable	expectation	of	what	the	directors	
should	and	should	not	have	done	in	the	situation	that	they	found	themselves.	
The	judge,	appearing	keen	not	to	encourage	defensive	business	practice,	
cautions	that	if	directors	are	judged	too	harshly,	‘with	the	benefit	of	hindsight’,	
such	an	‘austere	approach’	may	lead	directors	to	rush	too	soon	to	put	their	
companies	into	liquidation	for	fear	of	being	sued	for	wrongful	trading.	The	
judge	empathises	with	directors	who	find	themselves	in	this	no-win	situation:	
‘…	if	the	directors	decide	to	close	down	immediately	and	cause	the	company	to	
go	into	an	early	liquidation,	although	they	are	not	at	risk	of	being	sued	for	
wrongful	trading,	they	are	at	risk	of	being	criticised	on	other	grounds	
...creditors…will	complain	bitterly	that	the	directors	shut	down	too	
soon…liquidating	too	soon	can	be	stigmatised	as	the	coward’s	way	out’.			
	
It	is	in	the	plurality	of	the	creditor-regarding	and	director-regarding	business	
judgment	logics,	as	these	manifest	in	the	actions	and	practice	of	the	judge,	and	
the	way	in	which	he	navigates	these	through	the	process	of	the	litigation	and	
the	organisation	of	his	judicial	activities,	that	we	identify	links	to	the	broader	
societal	activities	within	which	these	judicial	and	director	activities	take	place.	
These	competing	logics,	captured	in	the	agency	revealed	through	our	analysis	
of	judicial	practice,	serve	to	demonstrate	the	link	between	those	practices	and	
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the	institutional	context	within	which	they	take	place.	Judicial	practice,	as	a	
manifestation	of	these	competing	logics,	has	implications	at	a	broader	societal	
level	for	the	ongoing	tussle	between	director	authority	and	director	
accountability.	
	
Logics,	practices	and	links	to	institutional	societal	orders		
	
The	judge’s	practice		reveals	the	judge	acting	as	an	agent	of	the	state,	with	the	
discretion	to	operate	a	significant	re-distribution	mechanism,	whereby	he,	can	
order	one	group	of	citizens	to	assign	assets	to	another,	exercising	a	
‘bureaucratic	dominance’,	focussing	attention	on	the	status	of	one	group,	the	
creditors,	in	relation	to	another,	the	directors,	with	the	potential	to	redistribute	
assets	and	capital	between	them.	The	judge	must	decide	whether	to	hold	the	
directors	personally	liable	for	the	business	judgement	to	continue	trading	
(which	with	the	benefit	of	hindsight	turned	out	to	be	the	wrong	decision),	
informed	by	a	creditor-regarding	logic,	affording	remedy	to	the	creditors,	or,	
whether	informed	by	a	director-regarding	logic,	to	protect	the	directors	and	
their	business	judgment	on	the	basis	that	it	was	made	with	the	appropriate	
levels	of	skill	and	care.	On	the	facts	of	this	case	the	judge’s	action	appear	to	be	
informed	by	a	director-regarding	logic,	which	leads	him	to	conclude	that	it	
would	be	‘an	extraordinarily	harsh	result’	if	the	directors	were	found	
personally	liable.		
	
At	the	level	of	the	legal	profession,	the	narrative	is	an	intimate	account	of	this	
professional	aspect	of	his	practice,	and	in	particular	the	‘reasoning’	component	
of	that	practice.	The	issue	before	the	judge,	the	cause	of	action,	has	at	its	centre	
the	behaviour	of	directors	in	relation	to	the	companies	they	serve,	and	towards	
specific	corporate	constituencies	such	as	shareholders	and	creditors.		The	
judgement	is	therefore	cast	in	the	institutional	context	of	the	corporation,	a	
cornerstone	institution	of	society,	addressing	the	functions,	composition	of	and	
relationships	of	delegation	and	reliance	between	its	various	organs,	principally	
in	this	case,	the	company	itself,	with	its	creditors	and	directors.	The	judge	is	
ever	mindful	of	the	‘reality	of	commercial	and	corporate	life’	and	the	
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difficulties,	events	and	other	happenings	to	which	the	company	is	subject,	as	
well	as	the	board	processes	around	these,	are	exhaustively	examined	in	this	
case.	The	significant	implications	of	this	at	the	institutional	and	societal	level	is,	
that	if	such	an	order	is	made,	it	offends	the	fundamental	principle	of	the	
corporation	as	a	separate	entity	and	of	limited	liability	which	provides	the	very	
cornerstone	of	the	institutions	of	the	corporation	itself,	and	the	institution	of	
corporate	law	that	enables	and	constrains	its	creation	and	existence.		
	
Finally,	there	are	related	but	distinct	communities	who	have	an	interest	in	the	
judicial	practices	around	the	review	of	the	business	judgements	of	directors.	
These	include	the	community	of	corporations	in	aggregate,	shareholders	and	
the	wider	corporate	investment	community,	the	corporate	creditor	
community,	and	the	corporate	director	community.	Each	of	these	communities	
is	affected	by	the	judicial	practice	which	administers	corporate	law	and	the	
rules	regarding	director	authority,	director	duties	and	accountability	in	respect	
thereof.	The	law	provides	that	directors	are	expected	to	adhere	to	norms	of	
behaviour,	and	are	subject	to	duties,	so	as	afford	protections	to	the	
communities	who	have	a	stake	in	the	companies	they	direct.	Nevertheless,	the	
judge	in	this	case	appears	keen	to	protect	the	director	community,	and	not	‘to	
set	the	standard	required	of	the	directors	at	an	unrealistically	high	level’	or	
‘beyond	what	(the	law)	expects’.	At	the	societal	level	of	the	director	community	
the	judge	is	concerned	that	‘if	the	non-executive	directors	were	liable	to	pay	
millions	of	pounds	to	the	liquidators	in	this	case,	it	is	hard	to	imagine	any	well-
advised	person	ever	agreeing	to	accept	appointment	as	a	non-executive	
director	of	any	company’,	with	associated	implications	for	the	talent	pool	
available	to	boards.	
	
As	a	summary	of	empirical	findings,	the	judicial	narrative	of	judgment	captures	
competing	logics,	here	creditor-regarding	and	director-regarding	business	
judgment	logics,	as	they	are	revealed	through	the	agency	of	the	judge.	This	we	
have	uncovered	through	a	‘Schatzkian’	analysis	of	the	judge’s	narrative	and	we	
demonstrate	through	this	analysis,	how	these	logics	are	characteristics	of	
institutional	orders	(Thornton,	Ocasio	and	Lounsbury,	2012)	perceived	here	as	
 
 23 
the	institutional	orders	of	state,	profession,	corporation	and	community.	
Applying	our	combined	theoretical	perspective	to	our	analysis	of	the	narrative,	
we	illustrate	how	this	judicial	practice	is	embedded	in	a	broader	societal	
context.	
	
Discussion		
	
This	analysis	contributes	to	theorising	about	process,	practices,	logics	and	
accountability.	It	shows	that	practice	theory	can	address	‘big	topics’.	It	
demonstrates	that	process	and	practice	theorising	are	intertwined.	It	is	novel	
in	combining	practice	and	logics	perspectives,	theoretical	and	empirically,	to	
capture	plural	logics	and	show	a	connection	between	agency,	practice	and	
institutional	order.	Finally,	it	throws	a	fresh	light	on	accountability	and	how	to	
study	practices	that	constitute	accountability.	
The	study	lends	weight	to	advocates	of	practice	theory	who	refute	criticism	
that	it	cannot	handle	‘big	topics’	and	that	it	neglects	the	individual	(Hui,	
Schatzki	and	Shove,	2017:2).		It	treats	litigation	processes	as	significant	events	
whereby	judges	play	a	key	role,	with	consequences	that	go	beyond	the	winners	
and	losers	in	each	case.		The	making	of	law,	the	regulation	of	business	
judgement	in	this	instance,	has	the	potential	to	reverberate	through	practices,	
fields,	institutions	and	orders	over	time.	The	study	shows	this	by	linking	the	
individual	practices	of	the	judge	in	this	case	to	the	institutional	orders	and	
domains	across	which	those	practices	are	played	out.	By	addressing	the	
institutional	and	legal	implications	of	the	judge’s	practice,	as	it	relates	to	the	
decisions	and	actions	of	directors,	the	study	shines	a	light	onto	the	wider	
governance	debate,	revealing	mechanisms,	process	and	outcomes	of	director	
accountability	at	law.	
Our	conceptualising	judicial	practice	in	a	processual	way	engages	with	the	legal	
ruling	as	a	narrative	to	reveal	how	a	judge	enters	the	process	of	litigation	in	its	
ultimate	stages,	drawing	the	process	to	a	close	through	a	ruling	and	the	
delivery	of	a	judgment.	Set	from	within	the	context	of	the	wider	litigation	
process,	the	study	delves	deeper	into	judicial	processes	and	practices	by	
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analysing	the	judge’s	account	of	his	individual	actions,	seemingly	from	when	he	
first	evaluates	the	evidence,	settling	and	organising	his	version	of	the	sequence	
and	series	of	events	and	others’	accounts	of	actions,	into	a	cohesive	narrative	of	
the	facts,	and	then	‘reasoning’	his	way	to	a	ruling,	before	explaining	and	
justifying	his	decision	and	decision-making.		This	narrative	with	all	its	
language-in-use	(Schatzki,	2017)	is	shown	to	be	infused	with	practice-
organisers	such	as	rules,	understanding	and	telos.	This	is	one	way	in	which	the	
analysis	reveals	that	process	meets	practice.	The	vocabularies	of	practice,	
found	in	the	‘stories’	and	facts	of	the	case	before	the	judge,	the	statements	of	
the	law,	and	the	vocabularies	of	the	judicial	reasoning	afford	us	to	encounter	
communications	between	the	advocates	for	the	liquidator,	the	defendant	
directors,	and	the	judicial	response	to	the	same.	Judges	summarise	the	facts,	
make	sense	of	events,	reach	and	rhetorically	deliver	a	ruling.	In	these	
observations	we	can	appreciate	the	judge’s	agency,	encompassing	sense-
making,	choice	and	ultimate	decision-making.	But	in	keeping	with	practice	
theory	this	agency	is	to	be	understood	not	as	individual,	but	rather	collectively	
constituted	judicial	practice	shaped	by	past	judicial	practice,	future	aspirations	
and	institutional	logics.	In	this	way	the	study	makes	a	theoretical	connection	
between	individual	agency	and	societal	order	through	practices	and	logics.		
By	attending	to	practices	and	logics	the	study	is	different	to	existing	work	in	a	
couple	of	key	respects.		First,	other	studies	have	skilfully	uncovered	a	
relationship	between	law	and	logics	(McPherson	and	Sauder,	2013)	but	that	
analysis	involved	multiple	parties	each	with	a	different	logic.	This	study	is	
different	in	that	it	centres	on	a	single	actor	–	a	judge	–	a	significant	social	actor,	
faced	with	competing	claims,	navigating	available	and	accessible	logics,	
captured	by	the	analysis	(Reay	and	Jones	2016),	and	expressed	here	through	
the	dichotomy	of	‘creditor-regarding’	and	‘director	regarding’	logics.	Second,	it	
is	unusual	to	find	studies	that	attempt	to	actually	and	explicitly	offer	a	
theoretical	and	empirical	combination	of	practice	and	logics	perspectives.	
Having	used	a	narrative	approach	to	identify	and	follow-up	a	common	interest	
in	language	and	discourse	(Schatzki,	2017;	Thornton,	Ocasio	and	Lounsbury,	
2012)	the	study	captures	plural	logics,	makes	a	connection	between	practice	
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and	social	order,	and	shows	the	judge	exploiting	the	agentic	opportunity	
afforded	him	through	the	process	of	litigation.	The	judge’s	agency	is	socially	
and	temporally	embedded,	informed	by	the	past,	through	the	doctrine	of	legal	
precedent,	the	cultural	phenomenon	whereby	judicial	practice	in	the	present	
invokes	the	past	through	the	judge’s	attention	to	previous	cases,	and	where	the	
judge’s	own	aspirations	and	judgement	have	implications	for	the	future	
(Emibayer	and	Amir,	1998).	Temporality	features	as	the	judge	mentions,	
considers,	follows	and	applies	precedent	cases	as	part	of	his	own	immediate	
practice.	Judicial	practice	in	Continental	is	thereby	generated	out	of,	and	
contributes	to	a	dynamic	collective	of	judicial	practice,	and	has	the	potential	in	
turn	to	constitute	and	shape	the	institution	of	the	law	itself.		
Beyond	the	boundaries	of	the	law	and	work	of	the	judiciary	the	case	situates	
judicial	practice	as	part	of	the	category	of	organizing	practices	known	as	
‘corporate	governance’	(Thornton,	Ocasio	and	Lounsbury,	2012).	This	case	
lends	rare	insight	into	how	judicial	practice	is	embedded	within	the	field	of	
corporate	governance,	a	practice	which	directly	tackles	the	thorny	and	topical	
issues	around	director	accountability	within	boards,	to	the	companies	they	
serve,	but	also	and	to	other	communities	of	corporate	stakeholders,	such	as	
creditors.	The	relationship	between	corporate	governance	and	law	warrants	
further	research	for	greater	understanding.		The	question	of	what	is	perceived	
as	a	legitimate	intervention	by	courts	and	others	such	as	regulators	has	taken	
on	greater	significance	in	the	light	of	the	financial	crisis	and	more	recent	events	
when	boards	and	directors	were	perceived	to	have	been	incompetent	in	the	
judgement	of	risk.	Debate	about	the	consequences	for	directors	and	what	cases	
should	and	should	not	be	reviewed	at	law	is	a	matter	of	international	legal	and	
public	debate	fuelled	by	the	variety	of	international	practice	in	the	matter	of	
business	judgement.		
By	way	of	concluding,	we	offer	the	research	and	this	analysis	as	an	approach	to	
opening-up	further	analysis	of	regulatory	activities	and	practices	that	have	a	
strong	discursive	and	textual	component.	Our	focus	on	judges,	rather	than	
consultants	(Levina	and	Orlikowski,	2009),	is	distinctive	for	its	attention	to	text	
as	a	core	feature	of	practice	and	institutional	order,	the	production	of	which	
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can	have	significant	consequences	for	a	range	of	adjacent	fields,	practices	and	
actors.		In	this	regard,	there	is	scope	to	consider	other	situations	where	actors	
and	agency	are	being	increasingly	drawn	into	practices	of	review	and	
regulation.	Such	research	could	be	about	those	social	actors	in	regulatory	roles	
who	review	the	work	and	conduct	of	others	in	commerce,	public	services,	or	
those	who	lead	public	and	quasi-public	inquiries	into	events	in	the	aftermath	of	
crises	which	seemingly	have,	or	threaten	to	have,	a	destabilising	effect	on	
established	logics	and	order.		
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